Arts council England and public value: a critical review. by Gray, Clive
 1 
 
 
 
 
Arts Council England and Public Value: A Critical Review 
 
Clive Gray, 
Department of Public Policy, 
De Montfort University, 
Leicester LE1 9BH 
United Kingdom 
Tel: +44 (0)116 257 7787 
E-mail: cjg@dmu.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
Introduction 
Arts Council England (ACE), the quango with major responsibility for funding the 
arts in England
1
, has recently completed a major research project (at a cost of some 
£250,000 (approximately $510,000 or 360,000 Euros)) that has been intended to 
identify the future direction that it should take with regard to its’ responsibilities and 
functions. This research has been guided by recent developments within the public 
sector management literature which sees the role of public sector organisations in 
managing the development, and maintenance, of ideas of ‘public value’ as key to the 
reinvigoration of the public sector. Given that this underlying theme is central to the 
entire research programme that the ACE has undertaken it is worth examining the 
extent to which it can actually provide a meaningful basis upon which arts supporting 
organisations can effectively function. A second concern is with whether the research 
underlying the attempt to identify ‘public value’ has been carried out in such a fashion 
that it provides an effective basis for the development of new management and policy 
ideas for the arts funding sector. In both cases these questions have much wider 
ramifications than for simply the English (or even the British) case as they concern 
the underlying political principles upon which arts funding organisations operate, and 
how these organisations fit in with the wider body politic. 
 
Background 
Arts Council England (ACE) launched a major research project in May 2006 that was 
intended to identify the ‘public value’ that existed in their operations, and to use this 
as the basis for identifying how the management of their activities could be improved 
in the future (Bunting, 2006a; 2006b; 2006c).  
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The research that was undertaken for this purpose differed from run-of-the-mill 
audience research in that it involved a much greater use of detailed qualitative (as 
opposed to crude quantitative questionnaire) data than is normally the case. It also 
provided the possibility for on-line participation through the provision of a number of 
discussion forums (some based around questions generated from the first stage of the 
research, and some more open ones responding to contributions from external 
sources
2
). In total there were nearly 1700 contributions to the research project through 
involvement in ‘workshops’, ‘in-depth interviews’, ‘discussion groups’, ‘deliberation’ 
and ‘open space’ meetings and web discussions alongside the on-line opportunities 
that were available (Bunting, 2007, pp. 4-5). The result of this is that there has been 
generated a mass of information about the questions and issues that were discussed 
during the process of undertaking the research (this can be found at 
www.artscouncil.org.uk/artsdebate/research.php) and this is likely to form the basis 
for a great deal of future work concerning attitudes towards the arts in England (much 
of it being summarised in Keaney et al, 2007). Indeed, the entire project has raised a 
large number of questions about what the ACE is doing and how it could potentially 
be amended and, as such, has a great deal of ‘value’ in its’ own right. 
 
Questions, however, need to be asked about a number of issues associated with this 
research. Despite the amount of effort, and money, that has gone into it there are some 
severe methodological and analytical drawbacks to it that raise questions about the 
extent to which it can effectively serve as an adequate – or even appropriate – basis 
for the generation of new approaches to managing and funding the arts, not only in 
England but elsewhere around the rest of the world as well.  
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‘Best Value’: New Approach or Red Herring 
The underlying assumptions behind the ACE’s research can be found in the new 
‘public value’ literature (Moore, 1995; Denhardt & Denhardt, 2000; Coles & Parston, 
2006; Blaug et al, 2006). As such this approach needs to be investigated in terms of 
what it is, how it differs from previous approaches to public sector management, and 
whether it is appropriate for the arts funding sector. 
 
Identifying precisely what ‘public value’ is is something of an open question. The 
literature implies that it is at least one of: an approach to management; an end-product 
of the management process; a set of processes that organisations could/should/ought 
to pursue. The general idea appears to be that the delivery of public services should be 
focused at the improvement of both general processes within government so that the 
delivery of goods and services is improved (ie. the public will benefit and achieve 
improved ‘value’ from improvements in how public sector organisations operate), and 
at developing a better linkage between public sector organisations and the general 
public so that there is a better match of expectations between the two. This latter 
could be taken to be concerned with questions of public legitimacy, or with questions 
of service benefit. In the case of the former this could be through a concern with how 
the public can develop a better relationship with the organisations that serve them, 
either through understanding them better, or through exercising more direct control 
over them and their activities. In the case of the latter it could be through improving 
the organisation’s ability to deliver goods and services to the public, or through more 
direct public involvement in this delivery through the identification of service needs. 
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At this level ‘public value’ would appear to be another management case of 
everything and nothing. It is such a broad range of ideas, processes and organisational 
factors that it is difficult to discern what the phrase actually means. Much of the 
literature is concerned with vague generalisations about how ‘public value’ can be 
created and what it actually consists of. Coles and Parston (2006), for example, talk 
about the cost effective provision of high quality services; the achievement of 
desirable outcomes; the generation of high levels of trust between citizens and 
governments; and the ability to achieve key social outcomes cost-effectively. None of 
this, however, actually identifies where ‘public value’ actually resides: is it in 
provision, outcomes, trust, or cost-effectiveness? Is it in all of these or divided up 
between them in some fashion? It might appear that ‘public value’ is the latest buzz-
phrase that can be pedalled as the most modern version of public sector management 
snake-oil. A more simple version of the term, however, would be that it is simply 
concerned with identifying what ‘value’ (however the term is understood) is attached 
to certain areas of public policy by the public itself. This formed an important element 
of the ACE research and generated a great deal of material for consideration (see 
Cragg, Ross Dawson, 2007; Bunting, 2007) 
 
The proponents of the ‘public value’ approach would certainly disagree with the 
negative view of it as simply rhetoric (or, less kindly, jargon). Blaug et al (2006), for 
example, see public value as a function of ‘public service theory’ that attempts to re-
draw the relationship between hierarchical versions of bureaucracy and the 
democratic involvement of citizens. This ‘theory’3 effectively privileges managers 
over politicians in an even stronger fashion than that of the previous versions of 
public sector management which gave rise to the ‘new public management’ of the 
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1980s and 1990s with its mantra of ‘letting managers manage’ (see Flynn, 2007; 
Hughes, 2003). ‘Public Service theory’ effectively argues that managers, rather than 
politicians, are the actors who can most effectively bridge the gap between public 
sector organisations and the general public. This technocratic version of management 
denies politicians any meaningful place in the identification of goals (these being 
generated by the general public per se and translated into action by heroic managers 
whose only concern is with the wishes of the public). Such a de-politicised version of 
public sector management was a continual theme throughout the ACE’s research 
discussions (one of the on-line discussion questions explicitly asked ‘should members 
of the public be involved in arts funding decisions’, for example, with continuous 
complaints being expressed about overt political ‘interference’ in arts funding 
decisions: see the summary in Kearney et al, 2007). 
 
At one level this concern with the involvement of the public in the construction of 
public policy is something of a re-invention of already existing wheels. What is ‘new’ 
about it is that, in the American versions of the argument at least, it appears to be a 
conflation of concerns about a decline in citizen involvement in politics (argued to be 
a consequence of a loss of ‘social capital’ and trust in government: see Putnam, 2000), 
and public choice arguments about the inefficiency of governments in meeting public 
needs (Hindmoor, 2006). When these are combined with traditional American 
concerns with democracy and the nature of democratic government (with these going 
back to The Federalist Papers and de Tocqueville) there is a potent anti-politician 
mixture being generated (see Stoker, 2006, especially chs. 2-4) that leaves room for 
the disinterested bureaucrat to assume political centre-stage. (Even if this is expressed 
as being a matter of apolitical technical and administrative competence it is 
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inescapably political as a consequence of being concerned with values, legitimacy and 
resource allocation). 
 
In the case of arts funding in Britain the argument is based upon slightly different 
grounds. The use of the quango form and the attempt to insulate the decisions of 
bodies like the ACE from the potentially venal interests of elected politicians has a 
long history (Gray, 2000; Doustaly, 2007) and has always served to insulate the 
organisation from overt political control (even if there appears to be a strong belief 
amongst respondents to the on-line discussion forums that central government does 
control everything that the ACE does in a ‘hands-on’ rather than an ‘arm’s-length’ 
fashion). The idea that the ACE should take a lead in the management of the arts 
funding sector in a non-party political fashion is not, therefore, saying anything new at 
all. If anything it is simply a re-statement of the formal constitutional (and practical 
political) position of the ACE. Justifying this position, as the best value research does, 
through the use of normative principles and assumptions provides a basis for re-
enforcing the depoliticised basis of arts funding in Britain. It, however, neglects the 
fact that this basis is the result of political decisions in the first place.  
 
This point - that the research is simply re-stating old arguments – even if with 
potentially new justifications for them – raises further concerns with the ‘public 
value’/public service ‘theory’ argument. The normative basis upon which it is based 
can lead to as unfruitful a set of arguments as those which are generated when asking 
‘what is art?’ or even ‘what good are the arts?’ (Carey, 2006) in so far as they are not 
susceptible to any form of effective empirical evaluation or capable of argumentative 
resolution as a consequence of dealing with essentially contested concepts (Gray, 
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forthcoming). The consequence of this abstraction is that there can be a tendency to 
remove the argument from any particular concern with existing patterns of structure 
and behaviour and to prefer a Platonic search for the ideal in the context of a 
Rousseauean (or even Hobbesian) state of nature. In the case of the ACE research this 
has meant that a great deal of the discussion has been couched in terms that rather 
ignore the fact that the British political system operates on a basis of representative 
democracy with accountability and responsibility being vested in elected political 
actors. To demand that politicians be removed from the system in favour of apolitical 
technocrats is equivalent to demanding a revolution in the political system. There is 
nothing wrong with such a demand but it should be seen for what it is and this is 
something that the underlying premise of the research singularly fails to point out. 
 
Methodological Questions 
At this stage, the argument needs to move to a different level which concerns the 
underlying basis of the attempt to discover answers to the questions that the ACE 
raised. The methodology that was adopted to the research was a straight-forwardly 
qualitative one. This was a perfectly appropriate one to choose and, on the basis of the 
various reports that were produced, was undertaken professionally and thoroughly. 
However, and there is always an ‘however’, the extent to which such an approach can 
carry the weight that is then laid upon it is open to question. 
 
In the current case the ACE is hoping to use the ‘public value’ research as a tool for 
the development of new organisational and funding approaches and strategies to their 
functions (Bunting, 2007, p. 28). The difficulty is whether a methodology that 
provides depth of response is actually adequate to provide the breadth of response that 
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is required for a national organisation: in other words, there are concerns about the 
representativeness of the samples that provided the information that was used. While 
some attempt was made, for example, to use a socially representative sample of the 
general public for part of the research (details about sampling can be found in most of 
the research reports at www.artscouncil.org.uk/artsdebate/research.php), the sample 
size was far too small to allow for any statistical comfort, and, as a result, the findings 
are not sustainable at any level above that of the sample itself. The break-down of on-
line respondents (Keaney et al, 2007, p. 21) suffers from the same un-representative 
problem: there is no relationship between regional population and number of 
responses from each region, indicating that the research cannot be taken to be an 
accurate reflection of the population distribution between regions. 
 
If the findings of the research process suffer from problems of statistical 
representativeness then the management of the information collection stage also raises 
some serious questions about the adequacy of the findings that were generated from it. 
While the ACE is clear that the questions that formed the basis of much of their 
investigation arose from preliminary discussions with the public the rest of the 
research has been highly mediated: the questions and issues that have been 
investigated have been controlled by the concerns and interests of the ACE itself. 
While this is acceptable behaviour in an absolute sense, in the context of attempting to 
discover public perceptions of ‘value’ it is far more questionable. The idea that the 
arts provide ‘public value’ may well be self-evident to those with an interest in the 
field but it needs to be demonstrated, not simply assumed. Too much of the ACE 
research is based on assumption instead. As a result while a great deal of emphasis is 
paid to the different ways in which the arts are valued there is no consideration paid to 
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the point that this assumption is itself actually debatable. Starting from an assumption 
that the arts are valueless would potentially have raised a different set of reasons for 
valuing the arts than those which finally resulted. 
 
In this respect the emphasis that was paid to artists and representatives of arts 
organisations in the data collection stage is a further example of the unrepresentative 
basis of the research. While these individuals may form a major part of the ACE’s 
constituency they are already, presumably, in agreement with the proposition that the 
arts provide ‘public value’ in one sense or another. As such, uncovering any broader 
conceptions of ‘value’ is unlikely to occur as the discussion is effectively closed to 
alternative view-points. Effectively the research, in large part at least, is made up of 
an enclosed artistic world talking to itself. Discussions of how the ACE may do its job 
better as far as its existing clientele and potential clientele are concerned is a valid 
managerial concern and doubtless the ACE will have learnt a lot from the detailed 
findings that parts of the research process have generated. Using this, however, as a 
basis for the creation of national policies, approaches and strategies is not possible. 
For that to occur the research would have to start from the premise that it is the wider 
public that needs to form the focus for policy, not those who are already a part of the 
existing system. 
 
Again, there is some confusion about the intention of the research: if it were to be 
presented as simply a management device to investigate how the goods and services 
that the ACE delivers could be more effectively managed and targeted at existing 
users then there would be few problems with it (and it would probably still have 
worked out cheaper than going to firms of management consultants for an institutional 
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audit). If, on the other hand, it is intended to provide the basis for re-thinking about, 
and re-designing, what the ACE is doing in terms of its service delivery for the 
population of England as a whole then it is much less successful. The only way to do 
the latter is to actually talk to the general public. Focusing on existing users leaves the 
ACE open to accusations that ‘vested interests’ have dominated the system, and that 
what has been researched is ‘personal value’ rather any notion of larger ‘public 
value’. 
 
Conclusion 
In effect the ACE has placed itself in a position where it cannot possibly hope to win. 
The weaknesses of the underlying assumptions behind the ‘public value’ and public 
service literatures effectively deny the relevance of political rationalities of action in 
favour of technocratic versions of the same thing. Given that the current version of 
representative democracy that is force in Britain allows for the possibility of replacing 
unpopular politicians through the exercise of the ballot, and bureaucratic technocracy 
does not, then the view contained within ‘public value’ requires an overhaul of the 
entire British (or, at least, English) political system. At the more restricted level of 
‘public value’ that the ACE has adopted, based around ideas of identifying what value 
is placed on ‘the arts’, then there are still some severe methodological problems to be 
resolved. The data base that was used is statistically insignificant and cannot, with 
confidence at least, be used as a mechanism to generate any particular guide to future 
action for the ACE – or for governments.  
 
At best the ACE will be able to identify some directions for action in terms of their 
own internal workings. As such the exercise has not been entirely wasted, and the 
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wealth of subjective data that has been generated will also serve as a valuable 
resource for further research in the field. These, however, are rather limited successes 
and it may be that the exercise becomes viewed in the future as something of a missed 
opportunity not only for the ACE but for all arts funding organisations. 
 
References 
Blaug, R, L. Horner & R. Lekhi (2006), Public Value, Politics and Public 
Management: A Literature Review (London, The Work Foundation) 
Bunting, C (2006a), Arts Council Public Value Inquiry: Context, Rationale and 
Purpose (London, Arts Council England) 
Bunting, C (2006b), Arts Value Public Value Inquiry: Research Brief (London, Arts 
Council England) 
Bunting, C (2006c), Public Engagement With the Arts: Art Council England’s 
Strategic Challenges (London, Arts Council England) (available at 
www.artscouncil.org.uk/documents/publications/phpUHflNJ.doc) (accessed 7/11/07) 
Bunting, C (2007), Public Value and the Arts in England: Discussion and 
Conclusions of the Arts Debate (London, Arts Council England) (available at 
www.artscouncil.org.uk/downloads/publicvalueartsdebate.doc) (accessed 7/11/07) 
Carey, J (2006), What Good are the Arts? (London, Faber) 
Coles, M & G. Parston (2006), Unlocking Public Value (London, John Wiley and 
Sons) 
Cragg Ross Dawson (2007), The Arts Debate: Research Among Stakeholders, 
Umbrella Groups and Members of the Arts Community (London, Cragg Ross Dawson 
Qualitative Research) 
 13 
Denhardt, R & J. Denhardt, ‘The New Public Services: Serving Rather Than 
Steering’, Public Administration Review, Vol. 60, pp. 549-59 
Doustaly, C (2007),  
Flynn, N (2007), Public Sector Management (5
th
 Ed, London, Sage)  
Gray, C (2000), The Politics of the Arts in Britain (Basingstoke, Macmillan) 
Gray, C (forthcoming), ‘Managing Cultural Policy’, Public Administration 
Hindmoor, A (2006), ‘Public Choice’, pp. 79-97 in C. Hay, M. Lister & D. Marsh 
(Eds), The State: Theories and Issues (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan) 
Hughes, O (2003), Public Management and Administration: An Introduction (3
rd
 Ed, 
Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan) 
Keaney, E, C. Bunting, A. Oskala, J. Saucek, L. Smith (2007), The Arts Debate: 
Summary and Analysis of Consultation Responses (London, Arts Council England) 
(available at www.artscouncil.org.uk/downloads/Summaryandanalysis.doc) (accessed 
8/11/07) 
Moore, M (1995), Creating Public Value: Strategic Management in Government 
(Cambridge, Harvard University Press) 
Putnam, R (2000), Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Renewal of American 
Community (New York, Simon & Schuster) 
Stoker, G (2006), Why Politics Matters: Making Democracy Work (Basingstoke, 
Palgrave Macmillan) 
                                                 
1
 The ACE operates alongside local authorities, the national lottery and the Department for Culture, 
Media and Sport in this area. As the ACE is the body responsibility for distributing national lottery 
money to the arts it is responsible for the distribution of far more money to this sector than any other 
individual body in the field.  
2
 It should be noted that the author participated in both the on-line discussion forums and provided, at 
the request of the ACE, a topic for further discussion. 
3
 Apostrophes are strongly needed here: this is actually much more of a normative model based around 
preferred ideas of what the public sector should be doing and how it should be organised to do this. As 
such it is more of a philosophical construct than an analytical theory. 
